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IT ALTERNATIVES TO SOCIAL CONTROL
IN ORGANIZATIONS
Greg Elofson
School of Business Administration
Emory University
ABSTRACT
This paper extends theories of control as an organization design tool and empirically explores the efficacy
of delegation technologies in providing the equivalent of social (clan) control for effort-averse agents
engaged in low programmable, low outcome measurement task environments.
The exploratory evaluation of delegation technologies suggests new control alternatives that are trust
building and therefore offer alternative organizational design possibilities in lieu of social control.
1 INTRODUCTION control need to be extended to encompass these issues.
This paper augments current theories of control to, first,
Theories of agency and control assume that an agent's recognize that there are organizational tasks that do escape
productivity can be measured and fairly evaluated; and if it traditional approaches to control. That is, while the tasks
calinot be measured, that truslworthy agents can be found are necessary, they can neither be fairly evaluated nor
and socially controlled to undertake those tasks that escape charged to trustworthy agents. The recognition of this
such measurement. But not all organizational activities can phenomenon is necessary for establishing a theoretical
be either satisfactorily measured or assigned to trustworthy foundation from which to further develop approaches to
individuals. In such instances, these activities may be control.
"designed-away," outsourced. or treated with ad hoc admin-
istraive respoiises that result ili, at best, temporarily accept- Second, the promotion of principal trust in agent behavior,
able results. facilitated by the use of delegation technologies, is sug-
gested as an alternative approach to bureaucratic, market,
An example of such an organizational activity is environ- and social control. Trust promoting delegation technolo-
mental scanning; identifying threats and opportunities to the gies, permitting the dynamic re-allocation of decision-
organization. In attempting to perform environmental making heuristics to machine actors, facilitate an agent's
scanning: organizations have used ad hoc administrative productivity while communicating the agent's decisions and
measures combined with outsourcing to circumvent the activities to the principal. Delegation technologies are
problematic nature of controlling the activity - but with considered as a control alternative because they offer the
only mixed success. Problems that continue to reduce same fundamental advantages as social control, fostering a
scanning effectiveness consistenUy relate to the following principal's belief that an agent can be trusted to act in his or
constraints: 1) recognizing organizational threats and her interest. Delegation technologies offer this alternative
opportunities is at a low stage of knowledge and is difficult without the necessity of either an apprenticeship program or
to program, 2) turbulence in the competitive environment a lengthy period of socialization.
makes performance evaluations based on the number of
correct predictions unrealistic, and 3) finding trustworthy Last, a series of exploratory studies are reported that
agents who have undergone a lengthy period of training for support the hypothesis that a delegation technology will
lhis task is also unrealistic. i,icrease a principal's belief that an agent is acting in his or
her interest Evidence for the plausibility of this approach
So, given that there are organizational activities that may be to control is provided, through direct and indirect measures,
characterized as having low task programmability, low by showing several groups' preference for trusting and
outcome measurability, and effort-averse agents, theories of hiring an agent whose work was performed through a
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delegation technology over a second agent whose work was more difficult to measure, principals prefer outcome based
not supported by a delegation technology. contracts.
Thus, this paper approaches these questions of control in
two parts. The first part draws on the work by Ouchi 3. THE ABSENCE OF CONTROL
(1979, 1977; Ouchi and Maguire 1975) and Eisenhardt
(1989, 1985) to discuss extensions to current theories of Agency theory presumes that the agent is effort averse and
organizational control and the need for alternative designs may shirk. Ouchi's control strategies imply the same agent
to permit necessary tasks to be performed. The first part tendencies toward effort aversion - except in the instance
continues by citing a well researched task, environmental of the socialized or "clan" controlled agent. This agent,
scanning, that has been difficult to control because the because of lengthy periods of socialization and/or appren-
work is difficult to program, the outcomes are difficult to ticeship, is assumed to have personal goals that are con-
fairly evaluate, and scanners are not the beneficiaries of a gruent with the organization's, making the clan controlled
long-term socialization process. The first part ends by agent, in effect, not effort averse. So, while neither the
outputs nor the behaviors of the clan controlled agent canasserting that principal agent goal congruity can be sup- be satisfactorily evaluated, he is trusted to perform in ways
ported with the use of delegation technologies because they that are in keeping with the organization's goals.
promote a principal's trust in a scanning agent.
Interestingly, these prescriptions tacitly introduce agent
The second part is empirical and reports on several explor- „type" into the choice of control strategies. That is, whenatory studies that lend support to the validity of a delega- either behavior or outcome measurability is high, the
tion technology based approach to control under circum- implicit assumption is that the effort-averse agent is the
stances of low task programmability, low outcome measur- subject of control. Conversely, when neither behavior nor
ability, and absent social control. Deciding whether a outcomes can be measured, the model assumes that a goal-
delegation technology can establish a significant degree of congruent agent will be selected (and that the organization
trust is the focus of this part because it suggests that an doing the selecting has access to such agents and is capable
agent is working in the principal's interest. 1 of successfully implementing a program of social control).
This discontinuity, however, need not exist. Figures 23 and
2. THEORIES OF AGENCY AND CONTROL 2b illustrate this by augmenting Ouchi's model to include
separate matrices for each kind of agent.
Ouchi (1979) describes three fundamental types of control
(Figure 1): market, bureaucracy, and clan. The appropriate In these two illustrations, control mechanisins are described
use of each is contingent on the nature of the task being for both the goal-congruent and the effort-averse agent.
performed. Market controls are appropriate when the Figure 2a illustrates Ouchi's framework, changed to recog-
outputs of employees are clearly measurable and relatively nize the absence of socialized agents. This framework,
independent of external events. Bureaucratic methods are showing control strategies for the effort-averse agent,
appropriate when interdependencies make output measure- differs from Ouchi's in the lower right quadrant. Here,
ment difficult and call for monitoring an agent's behavior. clan control has been changed to "no control." This change
Clan control methods are appropriate when both outputs is descriptive of available control mechanisms for the
and behaviors are difficult to measure. Clan control relies
effort-averse agent performing tasks having low behavior
and outcome measurability in an organization that will not
on the internalization of values that are congruent with the be exercising social control in a way that inspires trust in
organization's goals. that agent.
Eisenhardt (1985) has shown that agency theory provides Alternatively, Figure 2b illustrates what can be expected
an underlying rationale for matching control methods to from an organization employing goal-congrueitt agents.
situations. Agency theory suggests (Eisenhardt 1989) that When outcome measurability is high, the choice between
an agent prefers outcome based contracts as the influence market or clan controls would be based on efficiencief and
of external factors on his/her productivity diminishes. As whether the agents were risk averse (truly goal-congruent
the influence of external factors on outcomes increases, agents would, by definition, be risk neutral). But when
agents prefer behavior based contracts. Concerning princi- outcomes are difficult to measure, a clan mechanism would
pals, agency theory suggests that as the behavior of an probably be preferred (because the cost of "clan control"
agent becomes easier to measure, principals prefer behavior would probably be less than the information acquisition
based contracts. As the behavior of an agent becomes costs of behavior based control').
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Figure 1. Control Strategies
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Figure 2b. Goal-Congruent Agent
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4. WORKING WITHOUT CONTROL 1) don't perform or "design away" the activity
We may expect that few job descriptions would carry the 2) Redesign the task to develop desired4 principal
control difficulties of having low outcome measurability, agent goal congruence in the absence of available
low programmability, and effort-averse agents. We may social control.
also expect that organizations would "design away" those
particular tasks as often as possible. However, such organi- This second alternative, task redesign, is the subject of
zational tasks, perhaps because of their necessity, do exist. interest for the present and is meant to be considered in at
least those instances where the first alternative is considered
One example of a task having these three characteristics is to be untenable.
environmental scanning (Aguilar 1967). First, the environ-
ment is often turbulent resulting in outcome measurement
difficulty. Second, evaluating the behavior of individuals 5. AGENT GENERATED CONTROL
tasked with scanning is difficult because of the interdisci-
plinary nature of the work. Third, apprenticeship programs In the absence of behavior and outcome measurement, a
don't exist for these individuals - nor are environmental principal must do one of the following: 1) trust tile agent
scanners of US firms the beneficiaries of a long term to fulfill his responsibilities or 2) avoid entering into a
socialization process. contract with the agent. While Ouchi's description of social
control satisfies the first of these conditions by tacitly
Ad hoc administrative responses to this problematic scen- assuming the principal's trust for the socialized agent, social
ario have been similar to those suggested by Isenberg control is not always a viable alternative. Nevertheless,
(1984) and Chandler (1962). These include using volun- building principal trust in the agent remains a primary
teers or partial duty people (Lenz and Engledow 1986) and consideration or contingency in redesigning the agent's task
seeking outside consultants for financial and economic for "rno control" environments.
information. In other instances, the scanners have had to
depend on the continued support of a working champion - Trust has been described in the academic literature as "an
often necessary to keep the scanning process from being set expectancy held by an individual or a group that the word,
aside for more easily justified concerns (Engledow and promise, verbal or written statement of another individual
Lenz 1985). or group can be relied upon" (Rotter 1967). Furthermore,
trust has been studied as a condition in which a person is
Not surprisingly, the loss of a champion for the scanning willing to rely on another to achieve a desired objective in
effort, together with the lack of available control methods, a risky situation (Giffin 1967), as well as embodying the
often results in the group being disbanded (Lenz and hope that a person with whom one must work will perform
Engledow 1986). In fact, the absence of control over either in a competent manner (Barber 1983).
behaviors or outcomes in this function has produced a
variety of difficulties. For example, although recommenda- A benefit of trust is that it establishes a sense, on the part
tions from individuals having formal responsibility for of the principal, that the agent is acting in his interest. To
scanning results in many more action-responses than this extent, it acts in place of social control. Therefore,
informal group recommendations (Roy and Cheung 1982), when presented with tasks that have low programmability,
empirical studies have shown that, much of the time, low outcome measurability, and effort-averse agents, we
scanning is an unassigned and voluntary activity (Hambrick may pursue an agenda of building trust in the principal-
1981). Furthermore, Hambrick noted that while executives agent relationship.
did scan, they did not scan in their area of expertise. Still
another study showed that most divisions paid little atten- Trust is the outcome of observations leading to the belief
tion to information sent from the corporate level - having that the actions of another may be relied upon, without
no control over that function and preferring to develop their explicit guarantee, to achieve a goal in a risky situation:
own. This has resulted in incongruous sets of assumptions Promoting trust6 in the agency relationship requires that the
across divisions such as inflation rate estimates varying principal believe the agent is acting in his interest and that
from 2% to 22% (Stubbart 1982). the agent can be relied upon to achieve the principal's
objectives in a competent manner. Furthermore, Arrow
Given that organizational tasks such as environmental (1964) noted that "top management will always have to
scanning fall into the category of "no control," and given have some information about the internal workings of the
that ad hoc administiative solutions are not satisfactory, an individual activity" (pp. 408). Thus, the central approach
organization is left with two choices concerning the "no in utilizing infonnation technology to this end, to increase
control" status of the activities it wishes to execute: trust iii an agent and provide information about agent
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activities, is to focus on delegation technologies' as they fashion. Subjects were given a description of a business
provide the principal with a history of an agent's decision- objective, together with an explanation that they would be
making heuristics, and allow for necessary trust-building receiving the written assistance of two managers in achiev-
observations, without the noxious intrusion of a monitor. ing that objective. The managers' responsibilities were to
provide them with relevant decision-making information.
To capture the agent's decision heuristics and form an They were shown the briefs that were done by each of the
institutional memory, a number of software engineering managers reporting to them. For one of the manager's
innovations have been made. The architecture and proto- reports, and only one, additional information generated by
type of the delegation technology used in this study ac- an electronic messenger was included. For each of the two
quires knowledge rapidly and incrementally; learns to managers, the subjects were asked to answer a series of
improve its search strategy; succeeds through a large Likert-type questions (the McCroskey Trust Scales:
number of small knowledge bases instead of one large, McCroskey 1966) that gave an indication of their level of
monolithic one; and quickly adapts to the changing agenda trust in Lhe manager that had given the report.
of the organization.
The experiments were conducted within the same group
This approach provides an active channel of communication because individuals have widely differing baseline levels of
between analysts and managers, where their tasks are trust (Anderson and Clevenger 1963), and the experiment
structured as separate sequential interleaved processes. was focused on examining the effects of a delegation
This delegation technology approach makes use of a collec- technology on trust in a particular individual. Also, to
lion of electronic messengers. Here, the messengers act as avoid the possibility of semantic/presentation effects, the
"apprentices" to a manager, caching his decision heuristics evaluations presented by the two managers under scrutiny
as he monitors the environment. The messenger's orienta- were randomized.
tion is problem specific. For example, one messenger
would be concerned only with political violence problems The answers to the two sets of 22 McCroskey trust scale
while another would be concerned only with new techno- questions were analyzed as a paired t-test. Means for each
logy threats. Instead of using electronic mail messages to of the responses regarding the two managers, A and B,
communicate questions to an analyst, a manager will use a together with p-values for the two-tailed test, are reported.
messenger. The messengers make themselves available to Also, four additional Likert-type questions were asked of
all olher managers, improve their search strategy over time, the subjects, evaluating their direct preference for both
and explain their conclusions. hiring and trusting one manager over the other. The first
pair of these questions, regarding trusting A or B, as well
as the second pair, regarding hiring A or B, were evaluated
6. EVALUATION OF TRUST as unpaired t.tests. The means for these values, as well as
the p-values for the two-tailed tests, are also reported here.
By re-designitig a task witli the aid of a delegation techno-
logy, the event of an agent acting in the principal's interest Test 1coincides with the agent acting in his own interest. This
allows for the preservation of the agency premise that an
agent's goals are different from the principal's, while
Twenty-three students from a graduate level business course
satisfying the principal's requirement for some guarantee of were instructed to read a brief statement informing them of
agent performance. Fundamentally, an effon-averse agent their need to have relevant environmental scanning informa-tion as part of their business responsibilities.has an incentive to use a delegation technology because in
doing so he creates stack for himself by off-loading some You have the responsibility of developing Eagle
of his responsibilities to machines. He is, in effect design- Corp's overseas business and one of its concenis is
ing his own control system. Furthermore, a delegation in negotiating and winning a contract with the
technology should manifest principal trust in the agent Buhmar Company, Poland's largest manufacturer
because it allows the principal to see what an agent is of tractors. The negotiation is over a contract of
doing and thinking. The reapportionment of cognitive tasks several million dollars to supply parts for Buh-
to machine actors - actors that can report to the principal mar's new line of tractors. You have the respon-
- permits this evaluation. sibility for closing contract negotiations with
Buhmar. Moreover, you improve your company's
To evaluate whether a delegation technology has a positive position the longer the negotiations take. But, if
affect on principal trust, several exploratory studies were political violence breaks out in Poland, you stand
conducted. Each experiment was conducted in the same to lose income.
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Analyst B: Rationales used for Political Evaluation
Condition 1: Highly Likely Political mirmoil
IF the Pro-Regime Actors' Belief in Violence is Strong
and the Anti-Regime Actors' Belief in Violence is Somewhat Strong
and the Institutional Support for Pro-Regime Actors is Moderate
and the Institutional Support for Anti-Regime Actors is Strong
Then a condition of political tunnoil being highly likely is indicated.
To support this conclusion, the following must be verified:
Pro-Regime Actor's Relative Deprivation is Low
Anti-Regime Actor's Relative Deprivation is High
Coercive Force Available to Pro-Regime Actors is Strong
Coercive Force Available to Anti-Regime Actors is Not Strong
Condition 2: Likely Political Tirmoil
IF Pro-Regime Actors' Belief in Violence is Moderate
and Institutional Support for Pro-Regime Actors is Low
and Institutional Support for Anti-Regime Actors is Strong
then a condition of political turmoil being Likely is indicated.
to support this conclusion, the following must be verified:
Pro-Regime Actors' Relative Deprivation is Low
Anti-Regime Actors' Relative Deprivation is High
Anti-Regime Actors' Belief in Violence is Moderate
Coercive Force Available to Pro-Regime Actors is Strong
Coercive Force Available to Anti-Regime Actors is Not Strong
Condition 3: Political 'Iurmoll only Somewhat Likely
IF Pro-Regime Actors' Belief in Violence is Moderate
and Pro-Regime Actors' Institutional Support is Low
then a condition ofpoliticat turmoil being somewhat likely is indicated.
to support this conclusion, the following must be verified:
Coercive Force Available to Anti-Regime Actors is Not Strong
Pro-Regime Actors' Relative Deprivation is Low
Anti-Regime Actors' Relative Deprivation is High
Anti-Regime Actors' Belief in Violence is High
Coercive Force Available to Pro-Regime Actors is Strong
Figure 3. Messenger Generated Heuristics Provided for Subjects
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You have two political analysts working for you 3. lf I could have only one analyst working for me, I would
(A and B). They are located in different divisions choose analyst A:
within Eagle Corp. and have recently sent this A B C D E
week's update to you about political tensions in
Poland. Please read them and fill out the accom- 4. If I could have only one analyst working for me, I would
choose analyst B:panying questionnaire.
A B C D E
The students were told that two environmental scanning
professionals would be providing them with the needed
information. Next, they were then given an environmental Results
assessment by the first professional:
Figure 4 represents the data of the test run with this set of
Manager A's conclusion: subjects. Here, the evidence suggests that the effects of the
delegation technology generated information had a signifi-
Given the current political tensions iIi Poland and cant positive impact on trust. Greater statistical signifi-
the growing division between the government and cance was found when measuring trust in the analyst's
the citizens, I believe that political turmoil is intelligence and ability to provide an analysis of the current
highly likely - and that further destabilizing problem. Less significance was detected concerning the a
activities could result in an outbreak of violence. priori characteristics of the analyst (i.e.- questions 13, 14,
The fact that economic conditions have lately 16, 18 through 22).
deteriorated for tile workers, who are faced with
the military power controlled by the Central Com- Overall, the results of the final set of questions regarding
mitux, makes the problem worse.
trust and hiring preferences showed the effects of the
They were then asked to answer a series of Likert-type
delegation technology to be strongly significant (Figure 5).
questions (the McCroskey Trust Scale) about their trust ill The number of respondents for the trust preference was 19,
that individual's work (A =5= Strongly Agree, B=4= and the hiring preference was 20, as not all of the subjects
Agree, C=3= Neutral,D=2= Disagree, E=1= Strong- filled out this part of the questionnaire.
ly Disagree). Next, the students were given a very similar
assessment by the second professional, along with the
heuristics generated by a messenger used in this scanning Test 2
activity (Figure 3):
A second test was conducted to determine the presence of
Manager B's Conclusion: any order effects in the presentation of the managers'
findings. Fourteen students from a graduate level business
Political Turmoil is Highly Likely at this time. course participated in the experiment. The conditions of
The increase in tensions between the workers and the experiment were identical to test 1, except that the
government could quickly lead to an outbreak of manager's opinion that was accompanied by the messenger
violence unless the worker's current grievances are generated information was presented first.
quickly heard and acted on by the government.
This problem is being exacerbated by the Polish
army and Police remaining very loyal to the Cen- Results
tral Committee.
The results of subject's responses are shown in Figure 6.
Finally, they were given four questions regarding their trust The evidence suggests that, when the order of presentation
and willingness to hire either one or the other professional
(questions 3 and 4, however, may have been unclear - was reversed, the effects of the data generated by the
read as though the subjects were being asked if they could delegation technology still had a significant impact on the
trust the subjects had in A over B, to roughly the samechoose A or B over any analyst in the world):
degree (and slightly weaker) as for the subjects in test 1.
1. I trust the results given by analyst A more than analyst B:
A B C D E Overall, the summary questions at the end of the experi-
ment provided strong evidence that the subjects trusted and
2. I trust the results given by analyst B more than analyst A: preferred to hire the analyst whose information was accom-
A B C D E panied by the messenger generated information (Figure 7).
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AB
Mean Mean p-
Item Score Score value
1. I respect the analyst's opinion on the topic 3.34 4.00 .024
2. This analyst is not of very high intelligence 2.87 2.30 .001
3. This analyst is a reliable source of information on the topic 3.00 3.52 .014
4. I have confidence in this analyst 2.91 3.47 .001
5. This analyst lacks information on the subject 3.39 2.26 .001
6. This analyst has a high status in our society 3.08 3.21 .450
7. I would consider this analyst to be an expert on the topic 2.87 3.34 .070
8. This analyst's opinion on the topic is of little value 2.95 2.13 .002
9. I believe that this analyst is quite intelligent 2.91 3.52 .002
10. The analyst is an unreliable source of information on the topic 2.82 2.34 .045
11. I have little confidence in this analyst 2.87 2.26 .009
12. The analyst is well informed on this subject 2.95 3.47 .042
13. The analyst has low status in our society 2.73 2.43 .148
14. I would not consider this analyst to be an expert on this topic 2.91 2.65 .354
15. This analyst is an authority on this topic 2.82 3.21 .058
16. This analyst has had very little experience with this subject 2.69 2.47 .285
17. This analyst has considerable knowledge of the factors involved 3.08 3.82 .002
18. Few people are as qualified to speak on this topic as the analyst 2.69 2.87 .426
19. This analyst is not an authority on the topic 2.69 2.65 .814
20. This analyst has very little knowledge of the factors involved with the subject 2.73 2.27 .168
21. This analyst has had substantial experience with this subject 3.00 3.43 .066
22. Many people are much more qualified to speak on this topic than the analyst 2.82 3.13 .183
Figure 4. Results from Test 1
A B p-value
Trust Preference 2.158 3.474 .0006
Hiring Preference 2.450 3.900 <.0001
Figure 5. Trust and Hiring Preferences from Test 1
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A B
Mean Mean p-
Item Score Score value
1. I respect the analyst's opinion on the topic 3.85 3.57 .301
2. This analyst is not of very high intelligence 2.50 2.71 .189
3. This analyst is a reliable source of information on the topic 3.42 2.92 .130
4. I have confidence iii this analyst 3.07 2.78 .364
5. This analyst lacks infonnation on the subject 2.57 3.14 .014
6. This analyst has a high status in our society 3.07 3.00 .335
7. I would consider this analyst to be an expert on the topic 3.14 2.71 .138
8. This analyst's opinion on the topic is of little value 2.28 2.78 .110
9. I believe that this analyst is quite intelligent 3.42 3.14 .040
10. The analyst is an unreliable source of information on the topic 2.21 3.00 .009
11. I have little confidence in this analyst 2.63 3.14 .110
12. The analyst is well infomned on this subject 3.57 2.92 .013
13. The analyst has low status in our society 2.71 2.92 .189
14. I would not consider this analyst to be an expert on this topic 2.64 3.35 .044
15. This analyst is an authority on this topic 3.14 2.78 .238
16. This analyst has had very little experience with this subject 2.28 3.14 .004
17. This analyst has considerable knowledge of the factors involved 3.71 2.78 .004
18. Few people are as qualified to speak on this topic as the analyst 3.00 2.71 .263
19. This analyst is not an authority on the topic 2.90 3.00 .634
20. This analyst has very little knowledge of the factors involved with the subject 2.30 3.00 .069
21. This analyst has had substantial experience with this subject 3.50 2.85 .022
22. Many people are much more qualified to speak on this topic than the analyst 2.71 3.14 .053
Figure 6. Results from Test 2
A B p-value
Trust Preference 3.714 2.357 .0009
Hiring Preference 3.929 2.429 <.0011
Figure 7. Trust and Hiring Preferences from Test 2
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Test 3 mation was presented to executives. Thirty-five executives
participated in this test. They were given the same descrip-
A third test was run to determine whether an information tion of responsibilities as were tile students in the first test
"placebo" effect could be found. Because the effects of the First, they reviewed the analysis by the manager without
messenger generated information were positively related to additional messenger generated information, Second, they
trust in the previous experiments, the possibility of this reviewed the second manager's analysis with the messenger
effect being related to just "any extra information" was generated information.
investigated.
As with the other tests, the written opinions of the two
Seventeen students from a graduate business course served experts were randomized, so that the written opinion of A
as subjects for this test. The test was conducted in the on one executive's report appeared as the written opinion of
same order and with the same information as test 2, except B on another's.
that the messenger generated information was replaced by
the following information:
Results
A recent newspaper article summarized Poland's
past changes by reporting that, originally, Commu- Figure 10 represents the data of the test run with the
nist rule was opposed by most Poles. But the executives. Here, the evidence suggests that the effects of
Communists used police power and other methods the delegation technology generated information had a
to crush resistance. Communist controlled elec- significant positive impact on trust. Like the previous test
tions in 1947 gave them a large majority in the of this kind, the measures that had the least significance
new legislature. By 1948, Communist rule was corresponded to a priori opinions the subjects had of thefirmly established. managers' status, experience, and expertise (questions 6, 14,
16, 18, 19 and 22).
During the late 1940's, the USSR gained increas-
ing influence over the Polish government. In Concerning the direct questions of hiring and trusting1949, a USSR military officer, Konstantin Rokos-
preference (Figure 11), the executives clearly trusted thesovsky, was made Poland's defense minister. And, manager whose opinion was accompanied by the messengerPolish Communists suspected of disloyalty to the
generated information over the other manager. Also, theUSSR were removed from power. executives clearly preferred hiring the manager whose
opinion had the accompanying heuristics over the other.In 1970, strikes and riots broke out in Gdansk and
other cities. Thousands of Poles demanded better
living conditions and economic and political re-
7. DISCUSSIONforms. After several days of riots, Gomulka re-
signed and Edward Gierek became the Communist
Party leader. March (1987) noted that "interest in designing cost-effec-
tive incentives that induce rational, self-interested agents to
be honest in their reports is a major theme of contemporary
theories of agency." Given this, it may be said that provid-Results
ing cost-effective incentives when there are no control
The results of the test are shown in Figure 8. These results alternatives is equally, if not more, compelling.
show that the arguably irrelevant information not only had
no positive impact on trust, but rather on several dimen- The preceding tests have focused on establishing the vali-
sions (questions 5, 11, 15, 16, 21) detracted from trust. dity of such a goal in situations characterized by "no
control." The measure of validity has been based on the
Overall, based on the responses to the final four summary principal's trust in the agent. Overall, these tests lend
questions (Figure 9), it was concluded that the placebo support to the hypothesis that a delegation technology
information had no impact on either trust preferences or enhances trust in an agent's performance. Whether the
hiring preferences. results of the 22 McCroskey trust-scale questions showing
significance bears meaningfully on the question of trust is
answered directly with the second measure (trust preference
Test 4 amd hiring preference). These two measures showed a clear
preference for trusting and hiring the agent whose reports
The final test was run to determine whether trust was still were accompanied by the delegation technology generated
increased when the delegation technology generated infor- information.
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AB
Mean Mean p-
Item Score Score value
1. I respect the analyst's opinion on the topic 3.23 3.64 .095
2. This analyst is not of very high intelligence 2.88 2.70 .330
3. This analyst is a reliable source of information on the topic 3.23 3.00 .300
4. I have confidence in this analyst 3.00 3.00 1.000
5. This analyst lacks information on the subject 3.64 2.76 .014
6. This analyst has a high status in our society 2.88 3.17 .024
7. I would consider this analyst to be an expert on the topic 2.82 3.00 .337
8. This analyst's opinion on the topic is of little value 2.88 2.52 .274
9. 1 believe that this analyst is quite intelligent 3.05 3.23 .193
10. The analyst is an unreliable source of information on the topic 2.82 2.58 .410
11. I have little confidence in this analyst 3.11 2.58 .039
12. The analyst is well informed on this subject 2.82 3.11 .355
13. The analyst has low status in our society 3.05 2.70 .088
14. I would not consider this analyst to be an expert on this topic 3.23 3.17 .774
15. This analyst is an authority on this topic 2.58 3.17 .024
16. This analyst has had very little experience with this subject 3.11 2.58 .028
17. This analyst has considerable knowledge of the factors involved 3.00 3.23 .434
18. Few people are as qualified to speak on this topic as the analyst 2.64 3.00 .060
19. This analyst is not an authority on the topic 3.23 3.11 .610
20. This analyst has very little knowledge of the factors involved with the subject 3.11 2.64 .062
21. This analyst has had substantial experience with this subject 2.70 3.23 .039
22. Many people are much more qualified to speak on this topic than the analyst 3.11 3.05 .774
Figure 8. Results from Test 3
A B p-value
Trust Preference 3.000 2.938 .8584
Hiring Preference 3.125 3.062 .8578
Figure 9. Trust and Hiring Preferences from Test 3
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AB
Mean Mean p-
Item Score Score value
1. I respect the analyst's opinion on the topic 3.31 3.89 .007
2. This analyst is not of very high intelligence 2.91 2.29 <.001
3. This analyst is a reliable source of information on the topic 3.03 3.51 .006
4. I have confidence in this analyst 2.86 3.49 <.001
5. This analyst lacks information on the subject 3.40 2.20 <.001
6. This analyst has a high status in our society 3.06 3.23 .210
7. I would consider this analyst to be an expert on the topic 2.777 3.34 .010
8. This analyst's opinion on the topic is of little value 3.03 2.09 <.001
9. I believe that this analyst is quite intelligent 2.83 3.51 <.001
10. The analyst is an unreliable source of information on the topic 2.83 2.26 .003
11. I have little confidence in this analyst 2.89 2.20 <.001
12. The analyst is well informed on this subject 2.97 3.49 .012
13. The analyst has low status in our society 2.74 2.34 .025
14. I would not consider this analyst to be an expert on this topic 2.97 2.57 .075
15. This analyst is an authority on this topic 2.74 3.17 .005
16. This analyst has had very little experience with this subject 2.66 2.43 .132
17. This analyst has considerable knowledge of the factors involved 3.03 3.94 <.001
18. Few people are as qualified to speak on this topic as the analyst 2.63 2.86 .186
19. This analyst is not an authority on the topic 2.69 2.63 .700
20. This analyst has very little knowledge of the factors involved with the subject 2.77 2.09 .006
21. This analyst has had substantial experience with this subject 3.00 3.49 .009
22. Many people are much more qualified to speak on this topic than the analyst 2.83 3.20 .068
Figure 10. Executives' Responses to Trust Test
A B p-value
Trust Preference 2.065 3.484 <.0001
Hiring Preference 2.452 3.710 <.0001
Figure 11. Executives' Trust and Hiring Preferences
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The implications of these findings are several. First, the Identifying those tasks that fall into the "no control" cate-
opportunity for redesigning tasks to include a delegation gory is, therefore, an arduous task. Comparing the task
technology is made more plausible by these findings. characteristics of a company goal-congruent agent (high
Rather than seek ad hoc solutions, or abandon a given social control) with those characteristics of another com-
activity, a trust-promoting delegation technology may be pany in the same industry, of similar size, that has high
considered. Second, it has been shown that information effort aversion may or may not reveal the relevant differ-
about the manager's problem solving heuristics, and not ences, notwithstanding issues of culture, etc.
simply infonnation about the problem, itself. increases trust
in that manager. This is distinct from a decision theoretic Nevertheless, researchers are contin uing to develop a
viewpoint where value is placed on additional information variety of delegation technologies. Although this effort
typically finds its motivation in simplifying tasks for anabout a given problem.
agent, it offers both agents and principals advantages in
These results also suggest that principals, having the advan- control decisions. Measuring these effects on trust will
tage of trusting their agents, benefit from receiving useful require greater precision and a greater variety of methods.
As these technologies find their way into organizations midinformation that they are more likely to believe. The are used for control as well as increased span of control
iinportance of this is given by Feldman and March (1981): and decision-support longitudinal studies and field studies"Decision-makers discount much of the information that is will allow greater precision and understanding than is now
generated. Not all information is ignored, however, and feasible.
inferences are made. Decision-makers learn not to trust
overly clever people, and smart people learn not to be Finally, delegation technologies differ sharply from moni-
overly clever." toring technologies (Harris and Raviv 1978) in the rewards
they offer the agent. While a monitoring technology is not
Furtherinore, that the delegation technology is directly an integral part of work being done, a delegation techno-
under the influence of the agent performing a particular logy is. Both reveal agent activity. According to Eisen-
task may serve to ameliorate the typically undesirable side- hardt (1989), this information will cause the agent to act in
effects of control systems. For example, Argyris (1964) the interests of the principal. Unlike a monitoring lechnol-
noted that control is often accompanied by noxious by- ogy, the delegation technology will be gathering informa-
products such as a perceived sense of unfairness that tion about agent activity that is typically expertise oriented,
accents failures without showing why the failures were at a low stage of knowledge (Leonard-Barton 1988), by
necessary. He suggested that definition difficult to program, without the noxious effects
of typical control systems. Last, a delegation technology
a third alternative might be to place the responsi- also differs strongly from other "knowledge technologies"
bility for the design and use of the managerial (i.e.. expert systems) in both cost and flexibility. While
controls under the control of the people who are to expert systems are both expensive and time-consuming to
be controlled by these instruments....One might build - and also difficult to change - delegation technol-
wonder if employees might not misuse the privi- ogies are created in the course of an agent performing his
lege. Some available research leads one to doubt or her duties and quickly reduce the workload of an agent.
iL [pg. 247]
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APPENDIX A
DELEGATION TECHNOLOGIES
A delegation technology permits the real)portionment of cognitive tasks to machine actors, allowing agents to dynamically
share tasks with these same actors. Although still relatively new, delegation technologies have been shown to be useful in
such disparate areas as synthetic aperture radar interpretation, software troubleshooting, environmental scanning (Elofson
1994, 1995; Elofson and Konsynski 1991), e-mail filtering (Malone et al. 1987), and organizational learning (Elofson and
Konsynski 1993).
An example of a particular delegation technology is the Knowledge Cache %lofson and Konsynski 1991). The Knowledge
Cache is designed for scanning scenarios involving three task descriptions:
1) a senior manager (the principaD that uses information regardmg threats and opportunities to the environment
2) a scanning manager (the agent) with expertise in a particular area, whose responsibility it is to provide expert
interpretation of external events to the senior manager, and
3) an analyst whose responsibility it is to retrieve information at the request of the scanning manager.
The Knowledge Cache makes use of a collection of electronic messengers,' programs that induce, through example training
sets, the heuristics scanning managers use in environmental scanning. These electronic messengers provide an active
channel of communication between the analysts and the managers, where their respective tasks are structured as separate
sequential interleaved processes.
While providing a communication channel, the electronic messengers acquire and record the heuristics the scanning manager
uses as he/she monitors the environment Instead of using electronic mail messages to communicate questions to an analyst,
a scanning manager uses an electronic messenger - the equivalent of a structured message - to communicate a request fur
information. The figure below illustrates the typical activities that are involved in a scanning cycle, mediated by a
messenger, with the shaded parts representing those acts that are delegated to an electronic messenger.
Manager Analyst Manager
M M
Identify dgeator oliporttintly  ·Decid¢,Recall where to.  Recm *11''t "Ireat or
to scan for : . search for attribiitc-vallie cy,p,rlimity to look f4,rS · S
E E
Ch,4,se attribute values -N * find and evaluate -N  Recall atinblitc-values
10 se:urli for G information G ;ille.*ty f,  md
E E
Send attribute-value request to R Return attribute-value R E; nliwle allriliutc-value folind
analyst found to analyst
Chr.)*e .i[!Llitlifial
itifilln,ition,ir
Liat.qify cri.;ling
inforin 1 11 1,31]
Figure A-1. Messenger Mediated Scanning Activities
'The term "messenger" is used in place of the more accepted term, "intelligent agent,- to avoid any confusion with the agency theory
"agent." Architecturally, the three-layered messenger uses a similarity based learning algorithm to generate a knowledge base combining
search heuristics with rules, which in turn is used by a knowledge-scheduling, opportunistically searching inference engine.
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Based on the threat or opportunity to be investigated, an electronic messenger will, over time, acquire the questions
(attribute-values) a scanning manager asks of an analyst. The messenger's record of an analyst's past attempts at locating
inforination assists in the acquisition of that information. Further, the electronic messenger will attempt to evaluate all
attribute-values found and continue asking questions of the analyst until it has either classified the attribute-values it has
received or exhausted its problem solving knowledge, in which case it returns to the scanning manager with the attribute-
values and asks for a classification.
For the senior manager (pn'ncipaD who uses the interpretations provided by the scanning manager (agent), a record of that
scatining manager's decision processes is always available via the information stored in the electronic messenger. Having
access to these electronic messengers gives the senior manager a history of both the scanning manager's activities and
conclusions. What this delegation technology offers is 1) the tacit ability of the scanning managers to design their own
control mechanisms, 2) an incentive for agents to be more honest in their reporting - due to the fact that delegating work
to machine actors is only effective when done in earnest and this effectiveness results in the agent improving his or her
productivity, and 3) a record of activity that may be given to the senior manager to enhatice that principal's belief that the
agent is acting in his or her interest.
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APPENDIX B
DEFINING TRUST
The academic literature on trust provides a variety of meanings and perspectives. For example, Garfinkel (1964)
characterizes trust as a necessary taken-for-granted condition for social interaction: there must always be an "et cetera"
assumption where every agreement has unspoken but understood qualifications, assumptions, and provisions for future
actions (pp. 247-248). Here, trust provides a foundation for understandmg and interpretation, but it appears to have cultural
bounds, inasmuch as the nature of the unspoken may vary across individuals of different backgrounds. Trust, for Garfinkel,
is essential but brittle, easily broken by misunderstandings that naturally arise in the growing number of exchanges between
individuals of different cultures.
Luhmann (1979) notes that trust begins where knowledge ends: trust provides a basis for dealing with uncertain, complex,
and threatening images of the future. The implications here are several. Trust becomes a solution to cognitive dissonance,
faintly coerced through an inability to sort out uncertainty. Trust, here, is a reliance on some number of certainties in
turbulent conditions: despite conditions largely unknown, other individuals, whose actions affect one's own welfare, can be
counted on to act in a predictable and presumably benevolent fashion.
Barber (1983) is somewhat less circumspect in defining trust, characterizing it as the expectations involving a general moral
order and specific norms of competence and responsibility. For Barber, in the act of trusting, we make the belief that an
associate will act in accordance with a well understood conduct of behavior and we are capable of saying just what that
behavior entails. The implication is that the "et cetera" assumptions described by Garfinkel are, perhaps, better understood
- but no less brittle.
Lewis and Weigert (1985) define trust as "observations that indicate that members of a system act according to and are
secure in the expected futures constituted by the presence of each other for their symbolic representations." They, too,
characterize trust in terms of actions that conform to expectations. They also implicitly address the developmental nature of
trust noting that it is the outcome of observations.
Some definitions of trust, however, are without an explicit set of expectations. Rempel and Holmes (1985), suggest that
trust is simply "the degree of confidence that you feel when you think about a relationship." This concept of trust has a
strongly subjective bent that eludes substantiation through any process of matching expectations to outcomes.
Like many other definitions of trust Zaltman and Moorman (1988) define trust through prediction that is value free: "an
interpersonal or inter organizational state that reflects the extent to which the parties Ca17 predict one aiiother's behavior; can
depend on one another when it counts; and have faith that the other will continue to act in a responsive manner despite an
uncertain future." This definition does not address what we often assume to be characteristic of trust: that those
expectations are largely about outcomes that are in common with our own interests.
Giffin (1967) includes trust's implicit goal directed characteristic in providing an alternative definition: "reliance upon the
characteristics of an object, or the occurrence of an event, or the behavior of a person in order to achieve a desired but
uncertain objective in a risky situation." Further, she cited the following elements as essential to describing a trustingperson:
1. A person is relying on something.
2. This something relied upon may be an object, an event, or a person.
3. Something is risked by the trusting person.
4. The trusting person hopes to achieve some goal by taking this risk.
5. The desired goal is not perceived as certain.
6. The trusting person has some degree of confidence in the object of his trust.
Using these definitions, a composite definition of trust is suggested: trust is the outcome of observations leading to the
belief that the actions of another may be relied upon, without explicit guarantee, to achieve a goal in a risky situation.
Whether or not the exact nature of those actions can be enumerated is unspecified in this definition of trust. The expected
actions may be known or unknown.
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